

Data Mining in Widespread Video and Other Sensors

MOUNTAIN STATE INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INC.
MISSION MOUNTAIN TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATES

27 April 2010

Systems & Software Technology Conference

Paul D. Garnett, President
619 W. Columbia Ave., Sunset #1
P.O. Box 3738
Telluride, CO 81435

Fred A. Palma
10240 Melbenji Ct.
Elk Grove, CA 95757

Cody A. Benkelman
100 Second St. East
Suite 204
Whitefish, MT 59937

(304) 367-0500: Fairmont, WV Office
(970) 728-1972: Colorado Office
(970) 708-7723: Cell
pgarnett@msisinc.com

916 501-6051
Mountain State
Information Systems, Inc.
fpalma@msisinc.com

406 270-1176
Mission Mountain
Technology Associates
cody@MissionMtnTech.com



PREFACE

- ❖ SSTC Conference Challenge:
 - “What are these new game changing technologies going to be?”
 - ... *look into the future*
- ❖ Our Objectives:
 - Ask “*What if?*”
 - Facilitate dialogue regarding potential risks
 - Raise awareness
 - No definitive answers

PRESENTATION OUTLINE

- ❖ Introduction (Why are we here?)
- ❖ Objectives
- ❖ General Applications (Threats, Positive Uses)
- ❖ Scenario #1
- ❖ Scenario #2
- ❖ Full Body Biometrics
- ❖ So What? Where do we go from here?

INTRODUCTION

- ❖ What are the new risks in the exploitation of available data sources, given current/emerging technologies, and someone with a hostile intent?
 - Public (e.g. web cams, air traffic data, weather stations, others)
 - Private – behind firewalls (security cameras in stores, airports, etc.)
- ❖ What are the new business opportunities for someone with a non-hostile intent?

EXAMPLE SCENARIOS

- ❖ Non-hostile applications
 - “Big Brother” Auto Insurance
 - Coordinate resources during an “Amber Alert”
- ❖ Threats
 - Use public sensor data to plan / execute a terrorist attack, or coordinate a robbery
 - Use public sensor data to search for missing children – for human trafficking

PRESENTATION OBJECTIVES

From Initial Abstract

1. Summarize applicable technologies
2. Review statistics
3. Discuss firewall vulnerabilities
4. Explore applications enabled by access to data from a variety of sensors

#1: APPLICABLE TECHNOLOGIES

- ❖ Data mining, Feature extraction & Pattern recognition
 - *(text)* Content analysis, conflation
 - *(imagery)* Segmentation, template matching
 - *(video)* Object-based methods – HTM [Hawkins]
- ❖ Change detection
 - Image differencing, change vector analysis, correlation change image
- ❖ Artificial intelligence
 - Machine learning, genetic algorithms / evolutionary programming, neural networks, support vector machines
 - Low power, noise tolerant hardware (NeuroGrid [Boahen])

#1: APPLICABLE TECHNOLOGIES

- ❖ Data correlation & Data fusion
 - Normalized Cross Correlation (NCC), Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), Mutual Information [Cole-Rhodes]
- ❖ Data compression
 - Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT), Wavelets, MPEG4
- ❖ Real-time data processing
 - CloudShield “deep packet inspection”
 - IBM InfoSphere Streams

#2: STATISTICS

- ❖ Current number of web cams and other sensors:
 - Not easily obtained – unknown –
- ❖ Annual Growth Rate
 - Again unknown – exponential?
- ❖ Type
 - Streaming video
 - Still-frame web cams
 - Air traffic data
 - Weather stations
- ❖ Mode
 - Real-time - Really real-time? Or varying latency?
 - On line data archive

#3: FIREWALL VULNERABILITIES

Compromising Sensors on Private Networks Many Methods

- ❖ Automated password attack
- ❖ Phishing
 - Kneber botnet
- ❖ Security lapses
 - Predator UAV hack via SkyGrabber software
- ❖ Bottom Line: We need to presume that any system may be vulnerable to compromise

#4: THREATS AND APPLICATIONS

The previous 3 objectives set the stage for the rest of the briefing

There are hostile threats and opportunistic applications enabled by access to data from a variety of sensors

THREATS / OPPORTUNISTIC APPLICATIONS

COMMON TASKS

- ❖ Evaluation (scoping)
 - Identifying the data sources
 - Accessing the data
 - Extracting information / Processing data
 - Acting on the information
- ❖ Countering potential threats / opportunistic applications
 - Known vs. unknown
 - Today's briefing purpose: Raising awareness, not proposing a full set of solutions

IDENTIFYING THE DATA SOURCE

- ❖ What type & where are the sensors?
 - “Where” = both IP address & Lat / Long
 - Summarized on web sites
 - Automated “spider”
- ❖ Is the data quality (e.g. resolution of a web cam) adequate for the application?
 - Perhaps not today, but constantly improving
- ❖ Is the data rate adequate?
 - Can the data support the application?

ACCESSING THE DATA

- ❖ Publicly accessible vs. those behind firewall
- ❖ Connecting
 - Bandwidth & number of simultaneous connections
 - Storing and/or processing
 - Disk space, processing speed
 - Will our connection be detected? Covert connection required?
- ❖ Real-time threats vs. storing data for weeks (or mining archive data) and then acting on it
 - Real-time threat – no need to store data

EXTRACTING INFORMATION

- ❖ Automated vs. Manual
 - E.g., Coordinating a robbery or preplanning a terrorist attack, manual monitoring of web cams may be adequate
 - For facial recognition (e.g., supporting an “Amber Alert”), automation would be critical
- ❖ Automated Feature Extraction:
 - What features do we need?
 - What methods do we use?
 - How quickly do we need an answer?

EXTRACTING INFORMATION

- ❖ Automated Feature Extraction
 - Object Detection
 - *Change detection, segmentation*
 - Preliminary Classification (? Of interest / Ignore ?)
 - *Template matching, clustering*
 - Tracking
 - *MPEG-4 object-based compression (I, B frame)*
 - Detailed Classification / Identification
 - Method depends on application & metrics

ACTING ON THE INFORMATION

Carry out the Attack

- ❖ Depends on the Application / Threat
- ❖ Timeliness of the Data
 - “Take into Custody” the target person
 - You must be prepared to act FAST
 - Some scenarios do not require “instantaneous” action
 - “Big Brother Auto Insurance”
 - Can do analysis at your leisure

COUNTERING THREATS / OPPORTUNISTIC APPLICATIONS

- ❖ Threats identified in advance
 - Prevent the threat before it is started
 - Stop the attack in real-time once it has started

- ❖ Identifying unknown threats
 - Can previously unknown threats - attempts to exploit data sources - be detected?

EXAMPLE SCENARIOS

- ❖ Non-Hostile Applications / Opportunism
- ❖ Hostile Threats

HYPOTHETICAL OPPORTUNITIES (NON-HOSTILE)

- ❖ “Big Brother” Auto Insurance Company
 - Capture and store traffic camera data, then replay to identify fault after an accident
 - Map severe weather data to corroborate or invalidate crop damage claims
- ❖ Search for or Follow Individuals
 - Build profile of target based on photos, videos, other data
 - Software provides an alarm when individual sighted, or a report of where the individual has been – time/date stamped
 - Monitor a spouse, child, etc.

HYPOTHETICAL THREATS (HOSTILE)

- ❖ Terrorism, Theft, Personal Vendetta
 - Traffic web cams or “site of interest” video for planning or coordinating an attack/theft
 - Monitoring known targets (ref: www.PleaseRobMe.com)
- ❖ Identity Theft / Targeted Phishing:
 - Monitor video in Dept. stores for key shoppers (e.g. Mx. Bigspender)
 - Targeted phishing the next day “your purchase at Bloomingdales was rejected... Enter account info...” → Capture credit card #
 - *Ignores question of “how do they know how to match her face and email address?”*
- ❖ How would a terrorist exploit live video feeds or real-time airport traffic data from a major US city?
 - *Let's discuss privately*

BIG BROTHER AUTO INSURANCE

The Application:


- ❖ An auto insurance company records all available traffic video for 14 days
- ❖ Upon notification of any traffic accident, the historic video is reviewed to locate the participants
 - Can fault be proven?
 - Evidence of reckless / drunk driving or road rage?
 - Other scenarios (drivers switch after accident)?
 - Automated methods? Minimal...

BIG BROTHER AUTO INSURANCE


Scope

- ❖ 85 traffic cameras in Manhattan
- ❖ Bandwidth required = 256 kb/sec/camera
 - Disk storage for 14 days = 3.6 TB
- ❖ Assumes full motion (> 5 frames/second)
 - Ambiguity in exactly what happened?
- ❖ Size of car in image = 15 - 150 pixels
 - Positive ID possible?
- ❖ Traffic lights, pedestrians, other pertinent details visible?

Data Sources – NYC web cams



Data Sources – NYC web cams



BIG BROTHER AUTO INSURANCE

❖ **Data Analysis**

- Map web cams to Lat/Long
- Locate proper time sequence in video stream, at accident site & prior inbound traffic points
- Automated methods for identifying target of interest, accidents, risky behavior?

❖ **Other Issues**

- Web cam coverage and resolution (HD) increasing
- Legal to use as evidence?
- Can insurance companies already get this data from the government without having to set up their own data center?

BIG BROTHER AUTO INSURANCE

Video Examples

- ❖ MD-DOT – 128 kbps
<http://www.chart.state.md.us/TravInfo/trafficCams.asp>
- ❖ MD-DOT – 4 cameras
<http://www.chart.state.md.us/video/video.asp?feed=n>

SEARCH FOR INDIVIDUALS

❖ Applications

- Casino security – big spenders, suspicious people
- Amber Alert – find missing children
- Human Trafficking – find missing children
- Search for Terrorists / Escaped Prisoners

❖ Can individuals be identified in public web cams?

- Facial identification metrics
 - Interpupillary distance, etc.
 - Do web cams provide adequate detail?
 - If not today, is it conceivable in the near future?
- Full body biometrics
 - Body dimensions
 - Gait, other dynamic metrics

SEARCH FOR INDIVIDUALS

Scope

- ❖ Difficulty
 - *“Amber Alert! Find this face anywhere in Manhattan.”* VERY HARD
 - *“Follow my husband, ensure he takes the Jerome Avenue line, exits at 176th, goes to Murphy’s for lunch.”* A LITTLE EASIER
- ❖ X number of cameras in Manhattan
 - Restaurants, Department Stores, others on known routes?
- ❖ Bandwidth “required” = 256 kb/sec/camera
- ❖ Full body biometrics “requires” continuous motion (> 10 - 30 frames/second)
- ❖ Height of person in image = 15 - 150 pixels

SEARCH FOR INDIVIDUALS

Data Analysis

- ❖ *Automated methods for identifying targets of interest*
- ❖ Build geospatial map of web cam locations (if necessary)
- ❖ Locate proper time sequence in video stream (for possible later detailed analysis)
- ❖ Not completely realistic today... Too few data sources, but web cam coverage and resolution (HD) increasing

SEARCH FOR INDIVIDUALS

Other Issues

- ❖ Non-public data sources
- ❖ Police could build a private network of cameras on every road in/out of a city
 - Monitor for people based on stolen vehicle ID and/or facial recognition
 - Expand to capture every street, sidewalk, doorway, etc. in a city?
- ❖ Cameras to monitor every entrance to a school?
- ❖ Personal Freedom? Is this George Orwell's 1984?

SEARCH FOR INDIVIDUALS

Video Examples

❖ Times Square Video

<http://www.earthcam.com/usa/newyork/timesquare/>

❖ Times Square HD Video

http://www.earthcam.com/usa/newyork/timesquare/?cam=lennon_hd

❖ Video tools from Vitamin D


- Follow objects in motion
- Trigger on objects / people crossing thresholds

Think about Full Body Biometrics


FULL BODY BIOMETRICS

- ❖ Objective: Unique individual identification based on multiple views and dynamic analysis extracted from video subsets, using a multi-resolution data model compiled over time
- ❖ Applicable to other animals and objects (automobiles etc.)
- ❖ Full individual recognition based on a composite of numerous biometrics, all of which may be partially complete


EXAMPLE METRICS




MICRO



MACRO



MID



SUPER MACRO



DATA MODEL

- ❖ Four spatial scales
 - Micro, mid, macro, and supermacro
 - Network (Tree) data structure
 - Wavelets / Fractals for data compression

- ❖ Dynamic motion analysis integrated at macro/supermacro scales
 - Eigenvectors / Eigenvalues used to extract unique features at each scale
 - Populate predefined data models for high value targets (people on a watch list)

METRICS AS A FUNCTION OF SCALE


METRIC		Texture		Specular reflection		Corners		Edges		Color		Speed		Acceleration		Pose		Gait		Motility (3D, 5D, 6D)		Rigidity		Centers of mass		Traffic / Flow		Population		
Scale	MICRO	*	*	*	*	*																								
	MID		*	*	*	*														*	*									
	MACRO		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
	SUPERMACRO										*														*	*				

This is in addition to classic biometrics, e.g. facial metrics, iris/retina scan, etc.



DATA MODEL

Full Body Biometrics



SUMMARY

- ❖ A Glimpse into Our Vision of the Future wrt Data Mining of Video
- ❖ Scenarios: Opportunities and Threats
 - Big Brother Insurance Company
 - Search for Individuals
- ❖ Common Tasks
 - ID Data Sources
 - Access the Data
 - Extract / Process the Data
 - Act on the Information
- ❖ A lot possible today. More coming.
- ❖ Will there eventually be so many video cams that almost everything is captured? Available? Ripe for analysis?
- ❖ Will Full Body Biometrics provide an important augmentation to other methods, especially in scenarios that require covert monitoring?

TAKEAWAY MESSAGES

- ❖ Technology is available – or nearly ready – to act on these threats/applications
- ❖ Data quality and data coverage are lacking, but gaining fast
- ❖ Technology cost is high, but dropping
- ❖ We in the tech community need to be careful about what we offer to the world, and think about risks
- ❖ Full body biometrics offers great promise
- ❖ Continuing studies need to be performed
- ❖ Continue research to serve the needs of the defense / intel communities

Paul Garnett
970 708-7723
pgarnett@msisinc.com

Cody Benkelman
406 270-1176
cody@MissionMtnTech.com

Fred Palma
916 501-6051
fpalma@msisinc.com



REFERENCES

- “U.S. Warned of Predator Drone Hacking”, CBS news, 12/17/2009 http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504383_162-5988978-504383.html?tag=mncol%3btxt
- “Kneber botnet catches 2,500 companies worldwide” , the Guardian, 18 February 2010. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/feb/18/kneber-botnet-netwitness-cybercrime>
- K Boahen, **Neuromorphic Microchips**, *Scientific American*, vol 292, no 5, pp 56-63, May 2005.
- E Culurciello, R Etienne-Cummings, and K Boahen, **A Biomorphic Digital Image Sensor**, *IEEE Journal of Solid State Circuits*, vol 38, no 2, pp 281-294, 2003.
- “Hierarchical Temporal Memory: Concepts, Theory, and Terminology”, Jeff Hawkins and Dileep George, Numenta Inc., http://www.numenta.com/Numenta_HTM_Concepts.pdf
- M. Turk and A. Pentland. **Eigenfaces for Recognition**. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience*, 3(1), 1991
- Cole-Rhodes, Arlene, Kisha Johnson, Jacqueline Le Moigne, “Multiresolution registration of remote sensing images using stochastic gradient,” Proc. SPIE Vol. 4738, p. 44-55, Wavelet and Independent Component Analysis Applications IX; Harold H. Szu, James R. Buss; Eds. Mar 2002
- “Casino insider tells (almost) all about security”, ComputerWorld, 10 March, 2008
- IBM **InfoSphere Streams**: <http://www-304.ibm.com/jct01003c/software/data/infosphere/streams/>
- CloudShield: <http://www.cloudshield.com/>

DATA SOURCES

- Object tracking video
 - Numenta
 - <http://www.numenta.com>
 - Vitamin D
 - <http://www.vitamind.com/demo.php>
 - General Electric
 - <http://ge.geglobalresearch.com/technologies/imaging/>

- Traffic
 - NYC:
 - <http://www.earthcam.com/usa/newyork/timessquare/>
 - HD: http://www.earthcam.com/usa/newyork/timessquare/?cam=lennon_hd
 - NYC: <http://nyctmc.org/>
 - California: <http://www.video.dot.ca.gov/>

DATA SOURCES

- Air Traffic
 - <http://www.passur.com/airportmonitor-locations.htm>
 - NY
 - <http://www4.passur.com/jfk.html>
 - <http://www4.passur.com/lga.html>
 - CA
 - <http://www4.passur.com/sna.html>
 - <http://www4.passur.com/bur.html>
 - <http://www4.passur.com/san.html>

- Weather
 - www.anythingweather.com/
 - wxqa.com/stations.html
 - www.space.com/php/weatherbug/
 - www.met.utah.edu/mesowest/
 - Summary at <http://www.dslreports.com/faq/13342>