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Results of the First IEEE International Workshop on Safety of Systems

Bret Michael

Chair, IEEE Technical Committee on System Safety

Professor, Naval Postgraduate School

Tel. (831) 656-2655

bmichael@nps.edu

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Background

- ❖ **IEEE Technical Committee on System Safety (TCSS), sponsored by the IEEE System Council, held its first international workshop on issues relating to safety of systems of national and global significance**
 - ◆ Open working forum for obtaining a holistic view of system safety for a better understanding of the system safety discipline
 - ◆ Much of the discussion that took place during the workshop
- ❖ **Participants at the first workshop focused their attention on the relationships between safety and the other areas of dependability, such as security and reliability**
 - ◆ They expressed interest in leveraging these relationships to build **trustworthy systems**



Workshop discussion items

- 1. What are the three fundamental limitations and knowledge barriers for safety of systems today?**
- 2. What are the three most important research challenges?**
- 3. What are promising innovations and abstractions for building future high-confidence safety systems?**
- 4. What are possible milestones for the next five to ten years?**



Fundamental knowledge barriers for safety of systems today

- ❖ How to measure safety, security, and other “ilities” for stovepipe and system of systems
- ❖ How to make weightings explicit for tradeoff analysis, and are those the correct weights
- ❖ Need for both concepts and definitions to be understood by safety, security, and other communities
- ❖ We are unable to describe uncertainty in common terms
- ❖ Misunderstanding of what standards provide
- ❖ Practitioner competence
- ❖ Realistic expectations on practitioners
- ❖ Risk management, such as how to model security problems
- ❖ Understanding the roles and responsibilities of each discipline, and how they fit together
- ❖ What decisions are we trying to support from our analyses of systems



Fundamental limitations for safety of systems today

❖ Limitations

- ◆ A mindset of evolving vice building dependable systems
- ◆ Influences of organizational culture and established work practices
- ◆ Problem-solving approaches resulting in unnecessarily complex systems
- ◆ Lack of integration among policy, guidance (how to do it), standards and compliance enforcement
- ◆ Defining the system boundary
- ◆ Lack of codification within standards
- ◆ Unknowns: very large number of possible vulnerabilities, hazards, etc.
- ◆ Incentives are not congruent with the risks; identify what causes those factors to be in the decision formula (not defined in the standards today)
- ◆ System integration is done poorly, partly due to the lack of tool support
- ◆ Turf issues, such as between IEEE technical committees, societies, and councils



Most important research challenges

- ❖ There needs to be an as-is report of the safety and security domains
- ❖ Create the to-be report for both the safety and security domains, including the mission and sustainment domain
- ❖ Perform the gap analysis
- ❖ Assurance cases
- ❖ Automation support for building and analysis of architectures on an ility-basis
- ❖ Composition of systems into system of systems, including across organizations
- ❖ How do you specify uncertainty for security?
- ❖ Establish a sub grand challenge on dependability



Promising innovations and abstractions for building high-confidence safety systems

- ❖ Assurance cases that are usable across domains
- ❖ Tools interoperability
 - ◆ Tools that reuse existing data rather than rely on translating data between tools, analyses, etc.
- ❖ Formalize system of systems engineering techniques, concepts, etc., via means such as
 - ◆ DoD Guidebook on SoSE effort
 - ◆ IEEE International Conference on System of Systems Engineering (will be held in Monterey, CA in June 2008)
- ❖ Formalize the as-is availability and data trades between safety and security
- ❖ Formally codify precepts (programmatic, design, operations guidelines) for both safety and security, and cross compare



Things IEEE could do for us now

- ❖ **Establish avenues for members of the community of interest (COI) on dependability to share ideas and documents**
 - ◆ Encourage IEEE HQ to foster cooperation across societies, councils, technical committees to address system dependability
 - ◆ Encourage the IEEE Computer Society, International System Safety Society, and RAMS to re-establish joint conferences between safety and security; for international coverage: SAFECOM, IEE Software Safety Symposium

- ❖ **Establish a column editor for *Security & Privacy*, *Software*, or some other IEEE magazine to address the role between safety, security, and other ilities in building trustworthy systems**
 - ◆ A first step in this direction has occurred—the Computer Society and Reliability Society now jointly own *Security & Privacy* and have expanded the magazines scope to include trustworthy systems



Possible milestones for the next five years

- ❖ **Finalize the**
 - ◆ As-is report of the safety and security domains
 - ◆ To-be report for both the safety and security domains, including the mission and sustainment domain
 - ◆ Gap analysis
- ❖ **Standards on assurance that span safety, security and other aspects of dependability, such as ISO/IEC 15026, and safety standards such as AOP 52 and MIL-STD-882**
- ❖ **Have a roadmap of the body of knowledge**
 - ◆ Provide help to the engineers, program managers, and others on how to and what to apply to develop dependable systems
- ❖ **Making the accreditation more standard and visible**
- ❖ **Have a body of knowledge for assurance, in addition to having a breakdown of skill sets against roles**
- ❖ **Have cooperation with the IEEE Product Safety Engineering Society and other societies to build a safety-security accreditation program**



Possible milestones for five years and out

- ❖ Risk-decisions are made across all types of risk, risks throughout the lifecycle
- ❖ User high-quality software engineering methodologies
- ❖ Meet much higher expectations for dependability of systems (i.e., ultra-high dependability)—raise the bar



Themes for next workshop

- ❖ **Applying autonomic and biological computing (e.g., swarms) to address safety and security**
- ❖ **Certification of systems and people**
- ❖ **Roadmap—address what was brought up during the first workshop**
 - ◆ Relate safety and security to one another in the system-dependability context
 - ◆ Look into processes
- ❖ **Facilitation of communication between security and safety practitioners**



Things to do until the next workshop

- ❖ Identify interests of TC members
- ❖ Start a reading list
- ❖ Weekly posting of definitions and concepts for feedback—set up a wiki for the TC
- ❖ Invite papers that address integration of safety and security
- ❖ Put together a panel: Can safety and security be hooked up: Is there any relationship between the two?



To learn more...

- ❖ **Contact me about the upcoming workshop to be held later this year**
 - ◆ Take a brochure with you
- ❖ **Proceedings from first workshop available online**
 - ◆ <http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/hyperion-image.exe/NPS-CS-07-006.pdf>